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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ensuring that a defendant is competent to stand trial is essential for a fair 
justice system.  The criteria for determining a defendant’s mental 
competence to stand trial has long been a contentious issue in the 
jurisprudence of both the United Kingdom and the United States.  As it is 
impossible to see into a person’s mind and unjust to allow a mentally 
incompetent defendant to stand trial, the determination of mental 
incompetence has been left to the court.1  
This Note takes the position that, like the United Kingdom has already 
done, the United States should be re-evaluating its outdated standard in 
determining competence to stand trial and its implications for self-
representation.  This Note will first discuss and evaluate the background and 
history of the standards used to determine whether a defendant is fit to enter 
a plea and competent to stand trial in the U.K. and U.S.  Second, this Note 
will discuss the U.K. Law Commission’s Unfitness to Plead Consultation 
Paper and its rationale for changing the current standard.  Third, this Note 
will analyze and discuss problematic court interpretations of Dusky v. United 
States and the negative impacts of that case on the U.S.’s judicial system, 
especially in regard to self-representation.  Finally, this Note will argue that 
adopting the decision-making capacity test set forth in the U.K.’s 
Consultation Paper would be a positive and practical step towards bringing 
U.S. competency evaluation in line with modern psychiatry and the modern 
trial process. 
II.  CURRENT COMPETENCE EVALUATION STANDARDS 
On August 16, 2013, a U.K. court decided that sterilization was in a 
mentally disabled man’s (DE) best interests.2  In reaching this controversial 
decision, the court extensively evaluated DE’s capacity and best interests, 
taking into account context and circumstances under the Mental Capacity 
Act of 2005 (MCA).3  Factors such as the history of DE’s disability,4 the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 611 (5th ed. 2009) (stating 
that the issue of incompetency is ordinarily considered at the defendant’s initial appearance 
before a magistrate, but may be raised at any time during the proceedings or during the trial).  
 2 NHS Trust v. DE, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 2562 [2]. 
 3  Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9 (U.K.).   
 4 NHS Trust v. DE, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 2562 [2]. 
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nature of his disability, his local disability services,5 DE’s personality,6 his 
wishes and feelings,7 and the consequences of a further pregnancy from DE’s 
longtime girlfriend on DE’s life8 were taken into account for his competency 
evaluation.  The MCA gives extensive direction on how to determine 
whether a person lacks capacity in order to ensure that a just decision is 
made.9  
Since its passage in 2005, the MCA has been hailed as welcome and 
progressive legislation.10  Due to the MCA’s general success in 
determinations regarding capacity in non-criminal contexts, the U.K. Law 
Commission11 decided to research and issue a formal Consultation Paper that 
suggests a new legal test for fitness to plead in criminal cases based on 
Section 3 of the MCA.12  This resulted in a proposal to Parliament to extend 
the MCA’s test to the criminal realm.  
The U.K. Law Commission’s Consultation Paper highlights the problems 
resulting from a vague standard for evaluating a defendant’s mental 
competence and fitness to plead.  The U.K.’s current standard is based on an 
outdated case from 1836, R v. Pritchard.13  The Pritchard standard states that 
a defendant is fit to plead if the defendant “is of sufficient intellect to 
comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to make a proper 
defen[s]e—to know that he may challenge any of you to whom he may 
object—and to comprehend the details of the evidence.”14  Due to 
problematic and varying interpretations of this standard, the U.K. Law 
Commission’s submitted a formal paper calling for changes to the Pritchard 
standard so that it is consistent with “modern psychiatric thinking and with 
the modern trial process.”15  
                                                                                                                   
 5  Id. 
 6 Id. ¶ 36. 
 7 Id. ¶ 42. 
 8 Id. ¶ 63. 
 9 Mental Capacity Act, supra note 3, at Part 1.  
 10 THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON 
THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005, VALUING EVERY VOICE, RESPECTING EVERY RIGHT: 
MAKING THE CASE FOR THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT, 2014, Cm. 8884, at 3 (U.K.).   
 11 The U.K. Law Commission is an independent legislative body created by the Parliament.  
 12 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, Unfitness to Plead (Consultation Paper No. 197,780, 2010), 
available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp197_Unfitness_to_Plead_consultation. 
pdf.  
 13 R v. Pritchard, [1836] 173 Eng. Rep. 135.  
 14 Id. 
 15 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 1.15.  
2015] MENTAL CAPACITY  535 
 
 
The U.S. fitness/competency standard is comparably vague.  The U.S.’s 
competence to stand trial standard comes from Dusky v. United States, which 
states that evaluation of competence is based on “whether [the defendant] has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceeding against him.”16  
This standard has caused confusion and varying interpretations, especially 
in regards to self-representation and waiver of counsel.17  Due to these 
conflicting interpretations, some have called for a “revamping” of 
jurisprudence regarding waiver of counsel.18  Others call for a modification 
of the Dusky standard for clarification and guidance.19 
III.  COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: A HISTORY OF TWO NATIONS 
A.  Capacity in a Just Judicial System 
“To punish a man who lacks the power to reason is as undignified and 
unworthy as punishing an inanimate object or an animal.  A man who cannot 
reason cannot be subject to blame.  Our collective conscience does not allow 
punishment where it cannot impose blame.”20  This quote from Holloway v. 
United States, stands for the proposition that there is an inherent fairness 
issue in allowing an incompetent defendant to stand trial.  In the U.S. and the 
U.K., the law is clear that a criminal defendant has a fundamental right not to 
be tried, convicted, or sentenced while incompetent.21  This follows from the 
rationale that everyone is entitled to and deserves a fair trial.22 
                                                                                                                   
 16 362 U.S. 402 (1960).   
 17 Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta, Godinez and 
Edwards, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 391, 398 (2009) (contending that “the barebones Dusky test 
leaves much unanswered.”  For example, the test does not specify the degree or type of 
communication necessary to meet the standard for capacity.).  
 18 Id. at 410.  
 19 Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 313, 347 (2009).  
 20 Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666–67 (D.C. Cir. 1945).  
 21 See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 
171 (1975); R. v. Pritchard, [1836] 173 Eng. Rep. 135; Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 
1964 §§ 4 and 4A, as amended by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) 
Act 1991. 
 22 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
536 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 43:531 
 
 
1.  Current Fitness to Plead Standard—United Kingdom 
The current legal test for fitness to plead in the U.K. comes from the 1836 
case of R v. Pritchard.23  This case involved a deaf and mute defendant 
charged with bestiality.24  The jury was directed to find the defendant unfit to 
plead if they found that there was no realistic form of communication that 
would allow the prisoner to clearly understand the trial and be able to 
properly make a defense to the charge.25  R v. Davies26 added to the 
Pritchard doctrine by stating that the accused must also be able to instruct 
counsel.27  Together Pritchard and Davies set forth the following criteria to 
evaluate the question of fitness: “the ability to plead to the indictment, to 
understand the course of the proceedings, to instruct a lawyer, to challenge a 
juror and to understand the evidence.”28  
The Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act of 1991 
added that a judge may find an accused unfit to plead; however, a jury will 
still be required to decide whether the defendant “did the act or made the 
omission charged against him as the offen[s]e.”29 
2.  Current Competence to Stand Trial Standard—United States 
The common law standard in the United States for determining 
competency to stand trial is largely governed by a few landmark Supreme 
Court cases.  The most important, Dusky v. United States, provides the two-
prong test that has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions.30  
Under the Dusky standard, a defendant is generally found to be 
incompetent to stand trial if he or she does not have sufficient present ability 
to consult a lawyer “with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and 
if he or she does not have a “rational as well as factual understanding” of the 
proceedings against him or her.31  If the parties disagree that the defendant is 
incompetent, the judge will usually appoint one mental health professional to 
                                                                                                                   
 23 173 Eng. Rep. at 303. 
 24 Id.   
 25 Id.  
 26 [1975] 1 QB 691.  
 27 Helen Howard, Unfitness to Plead and the Vulnerable Defendant: An Examination of the 
Law Commission’s Proposals for a New Capacity Test, 75 J. CRIM. L. 194, 195 (2011).  
 28 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.46.  
 29 Howard, supra note 27, at 195.  
 30 362 U.S. 402 (1960).  
 31 Id.  
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examine the defendant.32  A state may assume that defendants are competent 
to stand trial and require them to prove incompetency based on a 
preponderance of evidence.33 
In 1993, the Supreme Court added to the competency jurisprudence in 
Godinez v. Moran,34 holding that the competency standard for pleading 
guilty or waiving the right to counsel is “the same as the competency 
standard for standing trial: whether the defendant has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him,”35 otherwise known as the Dusky standard.  
In 2008, the Court clarified its position on waiver of counsel in Indiana v. 
Edwards,36 holding that the U.S. Constitution “permits states to insist upon 
representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under 
Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they 
are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”37  In essence, 
Indiana v. Edwards contradictorily held that the standard for competency to 
stand trial was separate from the standard for competency to represent 
oneself.  Critics of the Edwards decision, such as criminal law professor 
Joanmarie Davoli, argue that instead of acknowledging that the competency 
to stand trial standard is “woefully inadequate,” the Court carved out an 
exception.38  This exception allows a criminal defendant to be found 
competent to stand trial, waive counsel, or enter a guilty plea, but still be 
found incompetent to represent himself at trial.39  Although only eight states 
have adopted the Dusky standard verbatim, the majority of jurisdictions in 
the U.S. have adopted a similar version of the two prong Dusky test.40 
Dusky is still at the forefront of competency jurisprudence but its 
vagueness and overbreadth result in problematic interpretations.  
                                                                                                                   
 32 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05. 
 33 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 452 (1992).  
 34 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
 35 Id. at 389. 
 36 544 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 37 Id. at 178.  
 38 Davoli, supra note 19, at 323.  
 39 Id. 
 40 Alan R. Felthous, Competence to Stand Trial Should Require Rational Understanding, 
39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 19, 22 (2011) (stating that “by far the most common 
[competency] standard in the United States is the two-pronged [Dusky] common law 
standard”). 
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IV.  U.K. LAW COMMISSION’S FORMAL CONSULTATION PAPER—UNFITNESS 
TO PLEAD 
The U.K. Law Commission is the statutory independent body created by 
Parliament to review laws and to “recommend reform where it is needed.”41  
The Law Commission aims to ensure that the law is “fair, modern, simple, 
and as cost-effective as possible.”42  So far, Parliament has implemented 
more than two-thirds of the Commission’s law reform recommendations.43 
In 2010, the U.K. Law Commission published a formal consultation paper 
titled “Unfitness to Plead.”  This 268-page paper critiqued the current fitness 
to plead standard found in R v. Pritchard and called for its reform.44  The 
paper makes a historical, practical, and scientific argument for reform and 
then strongly suggests the adoption of a new decision-making capacity 
evaluation45 based on the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  The next section of this 
Note will discuss the Commission’s consultation papers, the Commission’s 
recommendation that the Pritchard standard should be replaced, and what 
the new standard should be. 
A.  Why the U.K. Law Commission Wants to Replace the Pritchard Standard  
The Commission began by stating that the purpose of this formal 
consultation paper is to “address the law on unfitness to plead and make 
proposals for reforming the law in a way which is consistent with modern 
psychiatric thinking and with the modern trial process.”46  The main reasons 
the U.K. Law Commission want to replace the Pritchard standard are: (i) the 
high threshold for fitness; (ii) reliance on low intellectual ability; (iii) lack of 
a capacity requirement; and (iv) the lack of effective participation.  
1.  The High Threshold for Unfitness 
After providing some initial legal and historical background, the U.K. 
Law Commission addresses recent problematic interpretations of the 
                                                                                                                   
 41 LAW COMMISSION, About us, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/about (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).  
 42 Id. 
 43 LAW COMMISSION, Implementation of Our Reports, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/our-
work/implementation (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).  
 44 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12.  
 45 Id. ¶ 3.13.  
 46 Id. ¶ 1.15.  
2015] MENTAL CAPACITY  539 
 
 
Pritchard criteria.  One main critique posits that Pritchard sets too high a 
threshold for a finding of unfitness.  A study done by Dr. Tim Rogers and 
others found that a “startlingly low” number of defendants are found to be 
incompetent to stand trial.47  One author has asserted that an estimated 3,000 
to 3,700 primers needed to be in a psychiatric hospital.48  Once in prison, 
many of these defendants are so severely mentally ill that they may require 
an immediate National Health Services (NHS) transfer.49  Dr. Rogers’s study 
suggests that the low number of unfit findings results from the lack of a 
uniform procedure for the screening of defendants.50  His study also found 
five key difficulties in the assessment of fitness to plead.51  These issues were 
summarized by the U.K. Law Commission.  The first difficulty is the 
inconsistent application of the legal criteria for being unfit.52  The second 
stems from the fact that “fitness changes over time.”  Consequently, the 
accused might have been fit at the time of the assessment but was no longer 
fit at the time of trial.53  The third comes from the fact that psychiatrists tend 
to assess young defendants differently than adult defendants.54  Psychiatric 
assessments without consideration of legal standards constitutes the fourth 
difficulty.  Therefore, Dr. Rogers’s study suggested that a more collaborative 
approach is needed.55  The last difficulty comes from the potential for clients 
to deceive their lawyers by feigning illness.56 
Dr. Rogers’s study also found that many lawyers voiced concerns over 
problematic omissions in the Pritchard criteria that affect the “practicalities 
of the trial process.”57  These omissions include reference to memory 
capacity because memory is often affected by many mental disorders.58  
Other omissions of concern involve the lack of reference to decisional 
competence.59  One lawyer stated, “[i]t is a very difficult situation to have 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Tim Rogers et al., Reformulating the Law on Fitness to Plead: A Qualitative Study, 20 J. 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 815, 816 (2009).  
 48 DORA RICKFORD & KIMMETT EDGAR, TROUBLED INSIDE: RESPONDING TO THE MENTAL 
HEALTH NEEDS OF MEN IN PRISON 2 (2005). 
 49 Rogers et al., supra note 47, at 817.  
 50 Id. at 816.  
 51 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.63.  
 52 Id. ¶ 2.64.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. ¶ 2.65.  
 58 Id. ¶ 2.65(3). 
 59 Id. ¶ 2.65(4).  
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someone who cannot understand what is good for them, even after 
advice . . . they are at great risk of alienating the jury, alienating the judge or 
being convicted where they might not otherwise be.”60  According to the 
lawyers in the Rogers study, another troubling omission is the Pritchard 
test’s failure to consider the cultural background of a defendant.61  For 
example, one attorney-participant gave an example of this failure: 
One young man that raised anxiety in my mind was seventeen, 
from Eastern Europe and had seen his parents murdered.  He 
had literally lived on his own from the age of eleven, on a 
hillside tending goats.  He got an A for intelligence, was 
deemed fit to plead but there was a huge vacuum in his cultural 
understanding . . . he could not give evidence because either his 
answers or the questions asked were being misconstrued.62  
2.  Reliance on Low Intellectual Ability 
The consultation paper states that one of the principal problems with 
Pritchard is that it focuses on the intellectual abilities of the accused as 
opposed to his or her capacity to make decisions.63  This results in a 
disproportionate emphasis on cognitive ability.  The U.K. Law Commission 
reports that there has been a “good deal of academic criticism” of this failing 
of the Pritchard criteria.64  One U.K. law review article argues that “these 
nineteenth century criteria, which associate intellectual ability with insanity, 
were fundamentally flawed from the beginning, blurring what had been a 
well-recognized distinction between mental deficiency and madness.”65  
The U.K. Law Commission was also concerned that the Pritchard 
standard’s emphasis on ability to understand meant that it failed to take 
capacity and participation into account as part of the legal test.66 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. ¶ 2.65(7). 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. ¶ 2.70. 
 64 Id. ¶ 2.70. 
 65 Id. (citing Donald Grubin, What Constitutes Fitness to Plead, 1993 CRIM. L. REV. 748). 
 66 Id. ¶ 2.72.  
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3.  Lack of a Capacity Requirement 
In an example case given by the U.K. Law Commission, an appellant 
charged with murder and later found to be suffering from schizophrenia and 
psychopathic disorders, was deemed fit to plead after being able to instruct 
his representatives at the time.67  The U.K. Law Commission argues that 
there is a “strong case” that this defendant should have been found unfit to 
plead because his mental disorder meant that he lacked the “capacity to 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of his or her legal position, even though 
his or her understanding of the law and of legal process may be very good.”68  
However, under the current standard for fitness, if the accused has an 
understanding of the law, then they are fit to plead.69  Another example, 
Murray,70 was discussed by the Commission for the purpose of illustrating 
the anomaly occurring when an accused person can have a serious degree of 
mental deficiency yet still be considered fit to plead.  In Murray, the law did 
not “make sufficient allowance for the fact that the defendant’s memory of 
her thoughts and emotions at the time of the killing were such that she did 
not wish to discuss them with anyone and simply wished to be punished for 
what she saw as ‘murder.’ ”71  The Commission claims that the problem is 
that the system does not have “any regard for the process by which a 
defendant comes to the decision to plead guilty.”72  
4.  Lack of Effective Participation  
Another problematic issue that arises in the context of capacity is whether 
or not a defendant is able to participate effectively in his or her trial.  The 
Commission relies on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in 
a criminal trial.73  The European Court of Human Rights’ cases provides 
examples of effective trial participation.  For example, an accused must be 
able to consult with his or her lawyers and give them information sufficient 
to conduct a defense.74  From this premise, the U.K. Law Commission 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Id. ¶ 2.75.  
 68 Id. ¶ 2.78. 
 69 Id.  
 70 [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1792.  
 71 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.81. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Stanford v. United Kingdom, 282 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 26 (1994).  
 74 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.102. 
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derived the principle that effective participation is “active involvement on 
the part of the accused rather than just a passive presence.”75  
Participation is particularly important for those the Commission describes 
as “vulnerable defendants.”76  The Commission indicated that it is the court’s 
duty to ensure that these defendants, who are less effective participants due 
to impairment, are analyzed and assessed correctly to make sure that a fair 
trial is received.77  Specifically, the Commission recommends: (1) that there 
be a greater coherence between effective participation and special measures; 
and (2) a reformation of the legal test for unfitness to plead.78  
In sum, the Commission proposes that a new legal test should be 
developed to replace the current standard for fitness to plead.79 
B.  What the Pritchard Standard Should be Replaced with 
1.  The Decision-Making Capacity Test 
The U.K. Law Commission believes the Pritchard standard should be 
replaced with the decision-making capacity test.  This is the test used by the 
U.K.’s civil courts pursuant to the Mental Capacity Act of 2005.80  This 
alternative test takes a “functional approach” to capacity.81  The test involves 
analyzing a person’s ability to make a decision at a particular point in time, 
not just the person’s ability to make decisions in general.82  
The test as promulgated in the Mental Capacity Act looks at four different 
factors: (1) can the defendant understand the information relevant to the 
decisions that he or she will have to make in the course of his or her trial; (2) 
can the defendant retain that information; (3) can the defendant use or weigh 
that information as part of the decision-making process; and (4) can the 
defendant communicate his or her decisions.”83  This evaluation is “issue 
specific” meaning that a litigant could have multiple capacities regarding 
                                                                                                                   
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. ¶ 2.103. 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. ¶ 2.106.  
 79 Id. 
 80 Mental Capacity Act, supra note 3.  
 81 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.4. 
 82 Id. ¶ 3.1. 
 83 Mental Capacity Act, supra note 3, § 3.  
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different subjects.84  The concept of proportionality is also generally applied 
to the capacity evaluation in civil contexts.85  The Commission believes that 
this functional approach is preferable to a status86 or outcome87 approach to 
capacity.  
The Commission indicates that the decision-making capacity test 
encompasses effective participation and that it would ensure that the 
defendant in a criminal trial would be fairly evaluated.  Although the U.K. 
Law Commission does not believe every aspect of the civil system should be 
adopted,88 for the most part it would fit within the criminal standard for 
fitness to plead.  
2.  Provisional Proposals  
  a.  Meaningful Participation  
The U.K. Law Commission believes that in order for the accused to be 
able to meaningfully participate in his or her trial, he or she must be able to 
participate effectively.89  This is where a capacity-based test could help.  The 
concept of capacity is based on the ability to “do something.”90  The 
decision-making capacity test could be formulated broadly enough to cover a 
                                                                                                                   
 84 For example, a litigant may have the capacity to get married but lack the capacity to 
consent to a medical procedure. 
 85 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.8 (stating that by “proportionality,” the 
Commission means that the threshold of capacity varies depending on the decision which has 
to be made.  The more serious the possible consequences of the decision or the more complex 
the issue which is the subject of that decision, the higher the threshold of capacity required.).  
 86 A status approach to capacity determination is based on whether or not the defendant is 
diagnosed with a mental disorder or disability.  If the defendant has a disorder, then he or she 
is deemed to be unfit.  If not, then they are fit.  Id. ¶ 3.6.  
 87 An outcome approach is based on an assessment of the defendant’s decision and whether 
that decision is inconsistent with conventional values or otherwise irrational.  Id.  
 88 The U.K. Law Commission does not recommend that the principle of proportionality in the 
civil system should be adopted in the criminal system for three reasons: (1) lack of certainty in 
the procedure, (2) the method of dealing with a case once a person has been found to lack 
capacity or to be unfit to plead differs in civil and criminal law, and (3) civil law and criminal 
law are fundamentally different because of the role of sentencing in criminal law.  Id. ¶ 3.9.  
 89 Id. ¶ 3.35.  
 90 Id. ¶ 3.36. 
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variety of issues.91  This could help rectify prior problematic U.K. cases such 
as R v. Moyle,92 R v. Diamond,93 and R v. Murray.94  
Although those cases in particular refer to defendants with very severe 
mental illnesses, the Commission suggests that the capacity-based test of 
fitness should be broad enough to cover reasoning difficulties that can stem 
from causes other than cognitive deficiency or mental illness.95  Psychiatric 
professionals and legal scholars support this proposition.96  In an article 
written by executives from the Mental Health Act Commission, the authors 
suggest that a “sophisticated capacity test” must look beyond the question of 
cognitive capacity and, “address the interplay between cognition (knowing), 
emotion (evaluating) and volition (acting).”97  The article notes that a 
person’s impairment of decision-making ability is often a result of 
diminished or absent emotion such as embarrassment, sympathy and guilt.98  
After considering these factors, the Commission submits “Provisional 
Proposal 1,” which states: “The current Pritchard test should be replaced and 
there should be a new legal test which assesses whether the accused has 
decision-making capacity for trial.  This test should take into account all the 
requirements for meaningful participation in the criminal proceedings.”99  
The benefits of this proposal include bringing the current U.K. fitness to 
plead standard up to date with modern psychiatry.  It also brings the criminal 
test for capacity more in line with the civil test for capacity.100  
                                                                                                                   
 91 Id. (such as pleas, what instructions to give, or whether to give evidence).  
 92 [2008] EWCA (Crim) 3059 (stating that the defendant in this case was found fit to plead 
even though he had a history of psychiatric problems and diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia 
at the time of trial).  
 93 [2008] EWCA (Crim) 923 (holding that if the defendant was found at the time of trial to 
be fit then it is unnecessary to reexamine his mental condition, even if it is apparent to 
everyone else that there is an issue as to whether his decision making is materially affected by 
his mental condition).  This is a problematic holding because a defendant could be delusional 
yet fit to plead because he or she has some semblance of cognitive understanding.  U.K. LAW 
COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.86.  
 94 [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1792 at [5] (unreported) (stating that the evaluating psychiatrist 
who deemed the defendant unfit to plead stated that psychiatry and the law in relation to 
mentally ill defendants do not always sit together comfortably), available at http://www. 
bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1792.html.  
 95 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.38.  
 96 Id. (quoting Chris Heginbotham & Mat Kinton, Developing a Capacity Test for 
Compulsion in Mental Health Law, 2007 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 72, 78).   
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. ¶ 3.41. 
 100 Id. ¶ 3.45. 
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  b.  “Rational” Understanding  
The Commission recognized that a number of legal and medical 
professionals believe that there should not be a requirement of rationality in 
the new capacity standard101 and noted that there is not an express 
requirement in the Mental Capacity Act of 2005 that a litigant’s decision has 
to be rational in order for a person to have the capacity to make that 
particular decision102 as the focus under the Mental Capacity Act is on the 
decision making process rather than the objective rationality of the 
decision.103  The U.K. Law Commission rebuts this proposition by first 
noting that, aside from the fact that “rationality” is a term that is vague and 
lacks an agreed-upon meaning,104 a decision that may not be objectively 
rational might be rational when the subjective context is considered.105  
Furthermore, the Commission believes there is too much emphasis in the 
U.K.’s jurisprudence on the decision itself and that there should not be a 
“blanket requirement” that the accused must make a “rational” decision.106  
Although the Commission does not emphasize rationality, it does not 
disregard its importance. In fact, the Commission notes that the rationality of 
a litigant’s decision could be relevant in the civil realm because the accused 
is objectively irrational decision could “trigger the need for an assessment of 
his or her decision-making capacity.”107 
However, the Commission proposes that the new test in the criminal 
realm “should not require that any decision the accused makes must be 
rational or wise.”108  
  c.  Unitary Construct v. Disaggregated Test  
Once the Commission espoused the basic principles of the new, proposed 
capacity-test, it explained the new test’s application.  Two approaches were 
considered: a traditional unitary construct and a disaggregated test.109  Both 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Id. ¶ 3.48.   
 102 Id. ¶ 3.50.  
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. ¶ 3.48 (citing ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE 
ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 69 (1990)).  
 105 Id. ¶ 3.52.  
 106 Id. ¶ 3.54. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. ¶ 3.57.  
 109 Id. ¶ 3.59.  
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of these approaches stem from academic clinical literature addressing mental 
fitness assessment.110  The unitary construct test is applied at the outset of the 
litigation proceedings and determines the accused’s decision-making 
capacity for all purposes in relation to trial.111  The advantages to this 
comprehensive all or nothing test are its simplicity,112 uniformity,113 and 
reliability.114  
The disaggregated test can also be advantageous as it involves breaking 
down the trial into particular sections for which decision-making capacity 
would have to be assessed for each section.115  However, the Commission 
rejects the disaggregated approach in favor of the unitary construct 
approach.116 
The main reasoning for the rejection stems from the complex, time-
consuming nature of the disaggregated test.117  Further, the Commission 
believes that the traditional unitary construct is broad enough to consider the 
range of abilities a defendant must possess for fair litigation.118  According to 
the Commission, a “revised unitary test” would be sufficiently wide to 
account for the possible variety of tasks required as part of trial.119  The 
Commission proposes that the new legal test  
should be a revised single test which assesses the decision-
making capacity of the accused by reference to the entire 
spectrum of trial decisions he or she might be required to make.  
Under this test, an accused would be found to either have or to 
lack decision-making capacity for the criminal proceedings.120  
                                                                                                                   
 110 Id.  
 111 Id. ¶ 3.60. 
 112 Id. ¶ 3.63.  
 113 Id. ¶ 3.62 (“A clear delineation of the threshold would mean less divergence in clinical 
opinion as to whether it is met.”).  
 114 Id. ¶ 3.61 (stating that there is a theoretical advantage to the unitary construct because 
any form of unfitness to plead due to a defendant’s mental or physical condition max render a 
criminal trial inappropriate).  
 115 Id. ¶ 3.64.  
 116 Id. ¶ 3.64–.82.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. ¶ 3.9–.80.  
 120 Id. ¶ 3.99.  
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  d.  Proportionality 
As mentioned previously, a major concern with applying the current civil 
standard in criminal cases is the issue of proportionality.  If proportionality is 
adopted as the criminal standard a defendant’s fitness to plead would depend 
mostly on the “nature of the charge and complexity of the proceedings.”121 
Due to potential practical difficulties translating this civil standard into 
criminal law, the Commission does not believe that proportionality122 should 
be adopted as the criminal fitness to plead standard for the following reasons: 
(1) the potential uncertainty in the results yielded from a proportionality 
standard; (2) the problem of reconciling inherent differences between civil 
and criminal jurisdictions; and (3) the different roles of civil and criminal 
sentencing.123  
The Commission opines that the main problem with the application of the 
civil proportionality standard is that applying proportionality in criminal 
proceedings can lead to uncertain results.  The threshold for capacity under 
the proportionality approach depends on the “circumstances surrounding and 
consequent to the particular decision,” based in part on the gravity and 
complexity of the proceeding.124  However, it can be difficult to objectively 
measure these circumstances especially in a criminal trial.  The Commission 
points out that “what is serious for one person may not be serious for 
another.”125   
The second problem in applying the proportionality standard to a criminal 
context is found in the inherent differences of litigant capacity in civil versus 
criminal litigation.126  For example, unlike in criminal law where the 
emphasis is entirely on individual accountability, a civil litigant or defendant 
who lacks capacity can still litigate via his or her litigation guardian.127  In 
criminal law, if the defendant is found to lack capacity, “the trial shall not 
proceed” and the focus of the litigation will shift towards figuring out the 
defendant’s capacity and whether she had or had not done the act in 
question.128  
                                                                                                                   
 121 Id. ¶ 3.83.  
 122 See supra note 85 for the legal definition of proportionality in the context of U.K.’s civil 
system.  
 123 Id. ¶ 3.89.  
 124 Id. ¶ 3.87.  
 125 Id. ¶ 3.90.  
 126 Id. ¶ 3.94.  
 127 Id.  
 128 Id.   
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The third major issue is the role sentencing plays in civil versus criminal 
litigation.  Sentencing, a major part of the criminal process, does not have a 
role in the civil context.129  The Commission argues that, unlike in a civil 
trial, where a person could potentially have the capacity to litigate and accept 
an award but not have the capacity to later administer that award, separating 
questions of sentencing from a criminal trial is not as simple.130 
3.  Commission’s Conclusions 
In sum, the U.K. Law Commission proposes that the decision-making 
capacity test should be the new legal test.131  It is a unitary test and should 
take place at the outset of the proceedings.132  Although this proposal has 
been met with some criticism, it has mostly been well received.133  Some 
critics are skeptical of completely replacing the current standard. In 
particular, R.D. MacKay, a legal scholar in the area of mental condition and 
criminal law, stated his hesitation to abandon the Pritchard criteria.134  He 
worries that if this new standard were adopted, a cognitive evaluation would 
no longer exist in U.K.’s evaluation of fitness to plead.135  However, the 
Commission does not suggest abandonment of cognitive evaluation.  It 
simply states that in addition to cognitive deficiency, the law would also 
account for reasoning difficulties.136  The Commission states that under this 
test, “an accused would be found to either have or to lack decision-making 
capacity for all purposes in relation to his or her trial.”137  It also concluded 
that proportionality should not have any role in the new decision-making 
capacity test, due to the concerns of the unworkable differences between 
criminal procedure and civil procedure.138  
                                                                                                                   
 129 Id. ¶ 3.95.  
 130 Id. ¶ 3.96.  
 131 Id. ¶ 3.105.  
 132 Id. 
 133 See generally U.K. LAW COMMISSION, UNFITNESS TO PLEAD: CONSULTATION RESPONSES 
(2013), available at http://www.lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/unfitness-to-plead.htm; 
see also Howard, supra note 27, at 203 (concluding that the new legal capacity test proposal 
goes a “substantial” way towards remedying the problems connected to the current law on 
fitness to plead).   
 134 R.D. Mackay, Unfitness to Plead – Some Observations of the Law Commission’s 
Consultation Paper, 6 CRIM. L. R. 433, 445 (2011).   
 135 Id. at 445.  
 136 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.38.  
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
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V.  PROBLEMS WITH THE DUSKY STANDARD AND THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE 
U.S.  
As discussed previously in Part II, competency to stand trial in the U.S. is 
governed by the standard set forth in Dusky v. United States.139  This vague 
standard has caused problematic and conflicting interpretations of how a 
defendant should be evaluated for competency, especially in the realm of 
self-representation.140  Instead of acknowledging the current standard’s 
shortcomings, courts have tried to bend the Dusky standard in order to reach 
just holdings.  This has only caused more problems and has negatively 
impacted U.S. jurisprudence in this area.  
A.  Confusing Interpretations in the Context of Self-Representation  
The variable application of Dusky and the contradictory holdings in two 
major self-representation cases (discussed below) have caused inconsistent 
treatment of pro se mentally ill defendants.141  
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Godinez v. Moran that the Dusky 
standard is supposed to be a traditional, unitary construct.142  Specifically, the 
Godinez Court stated that the standard for measuring a criminal defendant’s 
competency to plead guilty or waive counsel is not higher than, or different 
from, the competency standard for standing trial.143  
After Godinez, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of mentally ill 
defendants in Indiana v. Edwards.144  In Edwards, the Court held that the 
Constitution permits judges to take into account and decide whether or not a 
particular defendant is mentally competent enough to conduct his own 
defense.145  Therefore, the court decided that the Constitution permits states 
to insist upon representation by counsel for those who are competent enough 
to stand trial, but who are incompetent to conduct trial proceedings by 
                                                                                                                   
 139 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 140 Tiffany Frigenti, Flying Solo Without a License: The Right of Pro Se Defendants to 
Crash and Burn – People v. Smith, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1019 (2013). 
 141 Id. at 1019–21 (listing a number of severely mentally ill defendants who were allowed to 
represent themselves and noting that the ramifications of self-representation support the need 
for a greater restriction on the right and standardization of procedures to provide guidance for 
courts).  
 142 509 U.S. at 407.  
 143 Id. at 397.   
 144 544 U.S. 164 (2008).  
 145 Id. at 178.  
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themselves.146  Edwards failed to reconcile the inherent conflict between its 
holding and the Court’s holding in Godinez.  
Legal scholars argue that the reasoning behind the Edwards decision was 
based on the Court’s fear of embarrassing trials147 where a clearly 
incompetent defendant chooses to represent himself at trial.148  Professor 
Davoli, professor of criminal law at Florida Coastal School of Law, states 
that, “startlingly, the Edwards Court acknowledged its discomfort with the 
spectacle of mentally ill criminal defendants representing themselves, as well 
as the inherent flaws of the Dusky competency standard.”149  The Edwards 
court stated that the “application of Dusky’s basic mental competence 
standard” could help avoid such a result, but that Dusky alone may not be 
sufficient.150  The Court should have taken this opportunity to evaluate and 
revise the standard for mental incompetence, but instead it chose to carve out 
an exception to the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation for 
defendants who suffer from mental illness.151  Professor Davoli argues that 
the Court thus made it “more difficult for mentally ill criminal defendants to 
waive counsel and represent themselves,” while making it “easier for courts 
using the weak Dusky standard to declare individuals competent who may be 
psychotic, delusional or hallucinating.”152   
B.  Flaws in the Dusky Standard  
As mentioned above, the Edwards court acknowledged the shortcomings 
of the Dusky standard.  Some of the major issues with the Dusky standard are 
its vagueness and its criteria for a determination of incompetence.  Together 
these two factors make the U.S. competency standard ineffective.  
The Dusky standard states that courts must determine “whether [the 
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
                                                                                                                   
 146 Id.  
 147 See Frigenti, supra note 140, at 1019–20 (discussing the trial of Colin Ferguson, the mass 
murderer who went on a rampage and gunned down a train on the Long Island Railroad.  
Ferguson chose to represent himself and conducted a defense that included questioning the 
victims he shot on the witness stand.).   
 148 Davoli, supra note 19, at 325.  
 149 Id. at 324 (quoting a portion of the Edwards case that referred to an amicus brief in that 
case, which reported one psychiatrist’s reaction: “How in the world can our legal system allow 
an insane man to defend himself?”).  
 150 Indiana v. Edwards, 544 U.S. 177 (2008).  
 151 Id. at 182 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 152 Davoli, supra note 19, at 325.  
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reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”153  
The requirement of “rational understanding” is one of the more 
problematic phrases in the above noted test.  As the U.K. Law Commission’s 
consultation paper stated, “rationality is a term both in wide common use and 
without any clear and fixed, agreed-upon meaning.”154  Because the term 
“rational understanding” is so vague, it often does not account for the 
contents of attorney-client communication.155  This means the mere fact that 
communication occurs is enough to satisfy the Dusky test, no matter how 
nonsensical the communication may be.156  
This vagueness in the Dusky standard leads to problematic applications.  
The case of Peter J. Troy is an example of this.  Troy was convicted of first 
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after murdering a Roman 
Catholic priest and a parishioner in a Long Island church.157  Troy was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and, although his lawyer requested that he be 
declared incompetent, the judge blocked this request and allowed for him to 
continue representing himself.158  The American Psychiatric Association, in 
its manual of mental disorders, states that those who suffer from persecutory 
types of delusional disorders are particularly inclined to focus on legal 
remedies to perceived injustices.159  New York Post writer Jonathan Stanley 
elaborated on the case of Peter Troy, stating that people with particularly 
severe psychiatric disorders usually suffer from anosognosia, rendering them 
“incapable of assessing their [own] condition.”160  In fact, Stanley, who was 
diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, says that he did not believe he was sick and 
“[n]either did nor does Peter Troy.”161  This is problematic because under the 
                                                                                                                   
 153 362 U.S. 402 (internal quotation mark omitted).  
 154 U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.48. 
 155 Davioli, supra note 19, at 331.  
 156 Id. at 325. 
 157 Bruce Lambert, Man who Killed L.I. Priest is Sentenced to Life in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 31, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/31/nyregion/man-who-killed-li-
priest-is-sentenced-to-life-in-prison.html.  
 158 Id. 
 159 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 90 (4th ed. 1994) (stating that “this subtype applies when the central 
theme of the delusion involves the individual’s belief that he or she is being conspired against, 
cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned or drugged, maliciously maligned, harassed, or 
obstructed in the pursuit of long term goals”).  
 160 Jonathan Stanley, The Killer and Me, N.Y. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, available at http://menta 
lillnesspolicy.org/firstperson/jon-stanley.html.  
 161 Id.  
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Dusky standard, a defendant who clearly has a mental disorder can still be 
found competent.  The defendant may be able to communicate in what a 
judge would deem “rational” way, but still lack effective communication 
with his or her lawyer.162  
The defendant’s factual understanding also does not add much to this 
vague standard.  The appearance of having factual understanding is 
comparable to an intellectual standard.  This can be problematic as shown in 
the Colin Ferguson trial described above.163  During Ferguson’s trial, the 
New York Times described him as seeming to “savor his legal lexicon.”164  
Using phrases like “[l]eading question, Judge.  Counsel is leading the 
witness,” he demonstrated a factual understanding for the criminal 
proceeding before him.165  The practical problem with this application of a 
“factual understanding,” standard is that it does not account for the mere 
appearance of factual understanding.  To outside observers of the courtroom, 
Colin Ferguson may have seemed functioning, but many psychologists were 
appalled by the judge’s decision to allow Ferguson to represent himself.166  
VI.  PROPOSAL 
Studies have shown that at least 16% of inmates in jails and prisons have 
a serious mental illness.167  Clearly, it is necessary to revise the Dusky 
standard to make sure that defendants who are mentally ill are not deemed 
competent when in fact they have cognitive or reasoning deficiency.    
The competency standard should be brought up to date to reflect practical 
realities in the modern trial world.  Rather than a standard focused on the 
                                                                                                                   
 162 See Davoli, supra note 19, at 332–33 (stating that a criminal defendant suffering from a 
delusional disorder would likely be found competent to stand trial despite being unable to 
meaningfully consult with his defense attorney.  Davoli also states that an accused may 
actually withhold information due to a belief that the defense counsel is part of the conspiracy 
designed to destroy the defendant.).  
 163 See supra note 147.  
 164 Janny Scott, A Murder Trial, Through the Looking Glass, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1995, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/04/nyregion/a-murder-trial-through-the-lookin 
g-glass.html.  
 165 Id.  
 166 Id. (quoting Timothy J. White, a forensic psychologist with the Federation Employment 
and Guidance Service, stating “[o]bviously he’s not fit to be in the courtroom serving as his 
own attorney.  It’s just like a mockery.  What has our system come to?”).  
 167 E. Fuller Torrey et al., More Mentally Ill Persons are in Jails and Prisons than 
Hospitals: A Survey of the States, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER 1 (2010), http://www.treat 
mentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf. 
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singular concept of rationality, the Dusky standard should be revised to 
reflect the principles found in the decision-making capacity test proposed by 
the U.K. Law Commission.  The most important principles are those that 
focus on the decision-making capacity of the defendant, the ability to 
meaningfully participate in trial, and the principle that this test should be a 
unitary construct as it was originally intended.  These principles should be 
used to help correct the ambiguity of the Dusky standard. 
A.  Decision-Making Capacity  
The competency to stand trial standard should reflect the decision-making 
capabilities of the defendant.  The defendant should be found competent to 
stand trial if the defendant can understand the information relevant to the 
decisions needed for trial, retain that information, use or weigh that 
information, and communicate his or her decisions.  These four specific 
criteria would help eliminate some of the vagueness found in lower court 
opinions.  A clear, specific standard would give guidance to the states and 
inform future competency legislation.  This would help alleviate some of the 
problems associated with Dusky’s vagueness.  
The focus should also not be on the “rationality” of a defendant’s 
decision.  As pointed out by the U.K. Law Commission, just because a 
decision is objectively rational does not mean that the defendant is generally 
rational.  Focusing more on the decision-making capabilities of the 
defendant, would eliminate the potential problem of judging defendants 
based on the appearance of a reasonable decision.   
B.  Meaningful Participation  
As argued in the U.K. Law Commission’s paper, capacity is based on the 
ability to “do something.”168  The decision-making capacity test proposed by 
the U.K. Law Commission would ensure that the test is read broadly enough 
so that the defendant would be able to meaningfully participate in his or her 
trial.  The U.K. Law Commission states that under this test, the case of R v. 
Moyle,169 referenced above, would be resolved more appropriately, as a 
defendant who was diagnosed with schizophrenia would be found to be 
incompetent at all trial levels.  R v. Moyle is very factually similar to the 
                                                                                                                   
 168 See U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.35.  
 169 [2008] EWCA (Crim) 3059.  
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Peter Troy case, as Troy was also diagnosed with schizophrenia and both 
were still found competent.  The adoption of a decision-capacity test that 
recognizes meaningful participation could resolve cases where the defendant 
is deemed competent when they are actually severely mentally ill.  
C.  Unitary Construct 
Finally, and most importantly, the competency standard should be a 
unitary construct as initially intended by Dusky.170  The advantages to this 
construct include its legal simplicity, its uniformity, and its reliability.171  
Having one test instead of splitting the capacity determination into different 
tests for different stages of trial makes the task of determining competency 
more efficient and more effective.  
Not only would the uniform construct be more practical, the decision-
making capacity test is broad enough to encompass all tasks necessary for 
trial.  Courts will have one detailed determination of both competency to 
stand trial and competency to waive counsel. 
Adopting a decision-making capacity test could be the first step in 
improving the system of competence to stand trial.  Although there are 
ultimately things that would have to be adjusted based on differences in legal 
systems, adopting the decision-making capacity test would not be too 
difficult.  Only standards, as opposed procedures would be changed.  Under 
the new standards, defendants will be evaluated and then compared to the 
general standard to determine overall competence for all stages of the trial.  
VII.  CONCLUSION  
There are many complex reasons why a defendant could or should be 
found competent or incompetent.  First, judicial and legislative systems in 
the U.S. should ensure that competency standards are consistent with modern 
psychiatric standards.  The U.K. Law Commission should be commended for 
recognizing and investing time in researching and identifying solutions to 
ensure fairness when determining when a defendant is fit to plead.  
The U.K.’s Pritchard standard is comparable in vagueness to that of the 
U.S.’s Dusky standard.  The U.K.’s guidelines are not necessarily nation 
specific, but they provide criteria that incorporate modern psychiatry with a 
                                                                                                                   
 170 See generally Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 
(1993). 
 171  See U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.63.  
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legal standard.  The Dusky standard has been problematic since it was first 
introduced in 1960.  The Supreme Court’s interpretations have not clarified 
the standard and have in fact confused the criteria for determining 
competency.  Due to its vague and ambiguous two prong standard, Dusky has 
not provided sufficient guidance to the states and lower courts on how 
exactly to determine competency, resulting in conflicting decisions and 
opinions.  If the standard in the U.S. is not changed, inconsistent applications 
will persist, allowing defendants who should be deemed incompetent to be 
found competent enough to waive counsel or stand trial.    
By creating a uniform standard that details specific criteria important in 
making a decision on competency, the U.S. can avoid further pitfalls with an 
inconsistent application of Dusky and similar state statutes based on the 
Dusky standard.  This would increase the probability that the defendants 
standing trial and waiving counsel are fit to do so. 
       
